US Sanctions Ukrainian Firms Supplying Drone Parts To Iran—The Same Drones Russia Uses To Attack Ukraine

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The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned two Ukrainian companies Wednesday for supplying critical aerospace components to Iran’s state-owned drone manufacturer HESA—the same entity producing Shahed-136 drones that Russia has launched by the tens of thousands against Ukrainian cities throughout 2025.

The sanctions expose a troubling supply chain in which Ukrainian-based firms allegedly acted as fronts for Iranian procurement agents, channeling attitude indicators, magnetometers, engines, and other critical parts to Iran’s military-industrial complex. The components ultimately enabled production of the loitering munitions that have become Russia’s primary tool for terrorizing Ukrainian civilians.

Ukrainian Companies Caught in Iranian Procurement Network

The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated GK Imperativ Ukraina LLC, based in Kharkiv, and Ekofera LLC, operating in Kyiv and Kharkiv, according to Business Insider. Both firms are accused of serving as front companies for Iranian procurement agent Bahram Tabibi, who allegedly used them to acquire aerospace materials for Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA).

HESA designs and manufactures the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 long-range loitering munitions, as well as the Ababil-series unmanned aerial vehicles used by Iran-aligned militant groups including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.

GK Imperativ was established in 2018 in Kharkiv and is owned by Tabibi Jabali Bahram, with Ukrainian business directories describing the company as handling chemicals and construction materials. Ekofera, also known as Econsfera (translating to “Ecosphere” in English), was founded in 2016 with offices in both Kharkiv and Kyiv, listed as a consultancy and intermediary for wholesale goods and machinery.

Iranian Agents Coordinated Complex Supply Network

The Treasury Department identified three Iranian nationals who allegedly orchestrated the procurement scheme. Bahram Tabibi used his Ukrainian shell companies to purchase and supply aerospace materials including attitude indicators—which help aircraft determine positional angle—and magnetometers that identify and measure magnetic fields.

Batoul Shafiei actively participated by facilitating financial transactions, ensuring GK Imperativ and Ekofera received payments from HESA and coordinating shipments destined for Iran. Saeed Pahlavani Nejad served as an intermediary between the Ukrainian entities and HESA, facilitating sales of alternator components, engines, sensors, and other critical equipment.

Part of Broader 32-Entity Sanctions Package

The Ukrainian companies were sanctioned as part of a larger Treasury action targeting 32 individuals and entities across eight countries—Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, China, Hong Kong, India, Germany, and Ukraine—that operate procurement networks supporting Iran’s ballistic missile and UAV production.

“Across the globe, Iran exploits financial systems to launder funds, procure components for its nuclear and conventional weapons programs, and support its terrorist proxies,” said John K. Hurley, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “At the direction of President Trump, we are putting maximum pressure on Iran to end its nuclear threat. The United States also expects the international community to fully implement UN snapback sanctions on Iran to cut off its access to the global financial system.”

The sanctions were imposed under Executive Order 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters. This represents the second round of nonproliferation sanctions since the United Nations reimposed sanctions on Iran on September 27, 2025, following Tehran’s continued non-compliance with international commitments.

Shahed Drones: From Iran to Russia to Ukrainian Cities

The bitter irony of Ukrainian companies supplying components for Shahed drones cannot be overstated. Russia has launched over 38,000 Shahed drones against Ukraine since January 2025, with more than 5,000 attacks recorded in September alone. These low-cost loitering munitions—costing approximately $20,000 per unit—have become Russia’s weapon of choice for overwhelming Ukrainian air defenses through sheer volume.

While Iran’s HESA designed the Shahed variants, Russia now locally produces thousands of the drones at its Alabuga facility in Tatarstan, 600 miles (966 kilometers) east of Moscow. The facility produces over 6,000 units monthly, up from 1,000 last year, with projections reaching 10,000 by year-end.

The Shahed-136, known in Russia as the Geran-2, is a delta-wing loitering munition capable of carrying explosive payloads up to 110 pounds (50 kilograms) and striking targets at ranges exceeding 1,550 miles (2,500 kilometers). The drones’ distinctive moped-like whir, traveling at roughly 100 mph (161 kilometers per hour), gives Ukrainian civilians just enough warning to seek shelter, amplifying their psychological impact.

Sanctions Consequences and Response

As a result of Wednesday’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. U.S. sanctions generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated persons.

Business Insider’s calls to both GK Imperativ and Ekofera went unanswered. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) declined to comment on the designations or any possible response.

The Treasury Department noted that GK Imperativ and Ekofera used networks of intermediary firms in Europe and Asia to supply HESA with aircraft parts and equipment necessary for military production, deliberately obscuring the ultimate destination of their shipments.

DroneXL’s Take

This sanctions announcement lands like a punch to the gut for anyone who’s been tracking the Shahed threat. We’ve spent the past year documenting how Iran’s $20,000 drones have fundamentally reshaped modern warfare—overwhelming Ukrainian air defenses through sheer volume while Russia reserves expensive missiles for high-value targets. The strategic calculus is brutal: force defenders to choose between $4 million Patriot missiles or develop entirely new interceptor systems.

But discovering that Ukrainian companies—based in Kharkiv and Kyiv, cities that have themselves endured relentless Shahed attacks—were supplying components to HESA? That’s not just ironic. It’s a systemic failure that demands answers.

This isn’t the first time we’ve exposed the tangled web keeping Shahed production humming. Back in July, we revealed how Chinese manufacturers covertly supplied engines to Russian drone makers by labeling them as “industrial refrigeration units” to evade Western sanctions. Now we’re learning that parts flowed from Ukraine itself—through what Treasury calls “front companies” operating with Iranian agents.

The timing matters. Just yesterday, we covered Treasury’s broader 32-entity sanctions package targeting Iran’s drone rebuilding efforts after the June 2025 war exposed vulnerabilities in Tehran’s arsenal. That article focused on the Chinese, UAE, and Turkish facilitators. Today’s revelation about the Ukrainian angle adds a deeply troubling dimension to an already complex procurement network.

Here’s what keeps us up at night: Were these truly “front companies” that Ukrainian authorities failed to detect, or does this represent something darker—corruption or willful blindness in a country fighting for its survival? The fact that GK Imperativ’s owner is listed in Ukrainian business directories as an Iranian citizen named Tabibi Jabali Bahram raises obvious red flags. How did an Iranian national openly own a Ukrainian company that procured aerospace components without triggering any alarms?

The Ukrainian government faces legitimate questions about oversight and due diligence. In January, the SBU arrested two Ukrainians who allegedly helped build Russian port infrastructure and delivered oil via Russia’s dark fleet. Ukraine clearly has the capability to investigate and disrupt these networks when it chooses to act. The silence from the SBU in response to these sanctions speaks volumes.

For the drone industry and policy community, this case study illustrates why export controls and sanctions compliance can’t be checkbox exercises. When $20,000 drones can terrorize cities of millions, every magnetometer, every attitude indicator, every engine component matters. The asymmetric warfare equation means even small-scale procurement networks have outsized strategic impact.

What’s your take on Ukrainian companies supplying Iran’s drone program? Should we expect more aggressive counterintelligence operations, or is this an inevitable reality of globalized supply chains in wartime? Share your thoughts in the comments below.