Senator Warns U.S. Drone Defense “Severe And Growing” Crisis As Protection Authorities Face January Expiration

Senator Warns U.S. Drone Defense “Severe And Growing” Crisis As Protection Authorities Face January Expiration | ADrones | 1 President Donald J. Trump, Senator Tom Cotton, and Senator David Perdue, August 2, 2017. Photo credit: Official White House Photo by Andrea Hanks / Wikipedia

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Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Tom Cotton is sounding the alarm on what he calls a “severe and growing” threat from unauthorized drone flights over U.S. military bases, border facilities, and major public events, warning that critical airspace protection authorities are set to expire just one week before next year’s Super Bowl.

In an interview with CBS News published November 13, 2025, Cotton cited alarming statistics: more than 350 unauthorized drone flights over approximately 100 military installations in 2024, over 27,000 drones detected within 500 meters (1,640 feet) of the southern border in the last half of that year, and stadium incursions that nearly doubled from 1,300 to 2,300 between 2021 and 2024.

The Arkansas Republican pointed to persistent drone incursions and gaps in law enforcement authorities, many of which lapsed during what he described as the record-long government shutdown earlier this year.

Critical Legislation Stalled as Deadline Looms

Cotton is backing two bipartisan measures aimed at closing enforcement gaps, but time is running short. The current airspace protection authorities expire January 30, 2026, which Cotton noted is “a week before the Super Bowl is going to be played.”

The first measure, the DEFENSE Act, co-sponsored by Democratic Senator Jacky Rosen of Nevada, would allow trained state and local law enforcement officers to detect, track and disable hostile drones at large public gatherings. The bill has garnered strong support from the NFL, MLB, NASCAR, and NCAA, who have all endorsed the legislation as stadium drone incidents continue to escalate.

The second measure, the COUNTER Act, co-sponsored by New York Democratic Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, expands the definition of a covered site to allow more American military bases to track and neutralize drones.

Cotton warned that if Congress fails to act urgently, “the U.S. may find it’s reacting after a catastrophic event, rather than being prepared before one occurs.” With the federal government now funded through January 30, 2026, the next major funding showdown is already looming.

Military Bases Lack Counter-Drone Authority

Defense officials say many U.S. military bases aren’t authorized under current law to deploy defensive counter-drone systems. In February testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen. Gregory M. Guillot, commander of both U.S. Northern Command and North American Defense Command (NORAD), revealed that only about half of U.S. military installations qualify as “covered sites,” which are authorized to intercept drones that pose threats.

While a handful of federal entities—including the Departments of Defense, Homeland , Energy and Justice—are currently authorized to detect, track, or disable drones, state and local agencies remain largely powerless even when drones threaten civilian sites, including airports or stadiums.

Ukraine Operation Demonstrates Drone Strike Capabilities

Cotton referenced Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb as evidence of how drone overflights or strikes might be carried out against U.S. or allied installations if defenses are not modernized and authorities are not made more coherent.

The coordinated Ukrainian drone strikes on June 1, 2025, targeted Russian Air Force assets at five air bases deep inside Russian territory. The operation reportedly deployed 117 drones to strike more than 40 Russian aircraft and caused approximately $7 billion in damage, according to Ukrainian officials. Two U.S. officials told Reuters that about 20 military aircraft were hit in the attack, with 10 destroyed.

“This example has been widely cited in U.S. security policy circles as a harbinger of how drone overflights or strikes might be carried out against U.S. or allied installations if defenses are not modernized, and authorities are not made more coherent,” Cotton said.

Border and Stadium Security Concerns Mount

Cotton pointed to the rise in drone activity over major sporting venues as evidence of the broader vulnerability of civilian targets, with heightened risks expected around the Olympics and World Cup—both set to be hosted by the U.S. next year.

A sports industry security official confirmed to CBS News that the threat to civilian targets at mass gatherings from drone overflights is “real and it’s increasing.”

“The vast majority are the clueless or the careless,” the official said, referring to drone operators who ignore or misunderstand temporary flight restrictions over stadiums and arenas. “But there are also cases where the drone operator has acted very aggressively and evaded detection,” the official added, estimating there are about “a dozen” such cases each year.

The official warned: “Thankfully, just by luck, we haven’t had something bad happen – whether an accident where somebody crashes their drone into fans, or whether they weaponize a drone and drop something dangerous into a stadium.”

Foreign Surveillance and Criminal Activity

U.S. security officials have previously issued public warnings that drone incursions near military bases, energy facilities and other pose risks. Many of them may be traced to foreign-made or unidentified systems capable of collecting imagery or signals intelligence.

Some of the incursions may be the fault of hobbyists or unwitting individuals, Cotton said, but inexpensive drone technologies have also proliferated across criminal organizations and non-state actors, raising the risks of mass-casualty attacks.

“It could be…unwittingly probing to see what the responses are – and responses have not been particularly strong, given these legal limitations,” Cotton said of some drone overflights of sensitive U.S. military installations.

Citing classification concerns, Cotton, who also sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee, declined to comment on how many overflights may have a connection to a foreign government, or which foreign governments may be involved.

DroneXL’s Take

We’ve been covering the escalating drone security challenge from multiple angles for years, and Senator Cotton’s warnings crystallize a problem we’ve documented extensively: America’s drone defense capabilities haven’t kept pace with the threat.

The numbers are staggering but shouldn’t surprise regular DroneXL readers. We reported in February 2025 when Cotton and Rosen introduced the DEFENSE Act that stadium drone incidents had surged 4,145% between 2018 and 2023 according to NFL data. Our border coverage has documented how Mexican cartels conducted over 27,000 drone flights within 500 meters of the southern border—the exact figure Cotton now cites—while simultaneously deploying $100,000+ counter-drone systems to protect their own operations.

The real scandal here isn’t the threat level—it’s the response time. These bills have been ready for months with bipartisan support and industry backing from every major sports league. Yet Congress has allowed airspace protection authorities to drift toward a January 30, 2026 expiration date that falls one week before the Super Bowl, one of the most attractive terrorist targets in America.

Cotton’s invocation of Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb is particularly apt. That June 2025 operation proved that coordinated drone strikes can penetrate thousands of kilometers into defended territory and cause billions in damage to high-value military assets. If Ukraine’s security services could smuggle 117 drones into Russia, launch them from concealed trucks, and destroy 40+ strategic aircraft, what could a determined adversary accomplish against U.S. stadiums or military bases with similar—or worse—defensive gaps?

The cost asymmetry problem we’ve covered extensively in stories about Pentagon counter-drone investments and Marine Corps anti-drone tech remains stark: defending against cheap drones costs exponentially more than launching them. But the solution isn’t throwing billions at the problem—it’s fixing the legal patchwork that leaves state and local authorities powerless and half of U.S. military bases without counter-drone authority.

One important nuance: Not every “drone” sighting represents a real threat. Our coverage of Belgium’s recent “mystery drone” panic noted how mass hysteria and misidentification of conventional aircraft led to deployment of German military counter-drone units—possibly to defend against helicopters and airplanes that observers mistook for drones. The same pattern played out during New Jersey’s drone scare last year.

That said, the documented threats are real enough. Cotton is right to push for urgent action. The question is whether Congress will act before the Super Bowl provides a worst-case-scenario test of America’s drone defenses.

What do you think? Should Congress prioritize passing the DEFENSE and COUNTER Acts before the January 30 deadline? Share your thoughts in the comments below.

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